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Criminal Law Practitioner
PUNISHED FOR POVERTY
Andrew Rock*
Ineffective assistance of counsel is rampant in death penalty cases. Lawyers defending capital cas-
es are frequently inexperienced, overworked, and underfunded. This results in defendants receiing" the
death penalty not because of their crimes, but because of their lawyers. Thi's is due in large part to the lax
standards for effective assistance of counsel the Supreme Court established in Strickland v. Washington.
Strickland also imposes a massive burden upon defendants who seek relieffor ineffective assistance of
counsel. This enables ineffective assistance of counsel to continue unabated. This system violates the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and undermines the crucial moral imperatives of retrib-
utiXism. tetributiXism requires that each offender receXe punishment for their individual deeds, not the
failings of their attorney. These massive injustices violate the values ofpeople on both sides of thepolitical
divide. Thus, this problem represents an opportunity for a factured country to unite behind a common
cause ofjustice. Solving it will require legislatures tofundpublic defenders and appointed defense counsel,
andfor the Supreme Court to modify Strickland and replace it with a new standard.
* J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Mississippi School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Berry for his guid-
ance in this endeavor and my mother and father for their constant encouragement.
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INTRODUCTION
the
on
the
"I have yet to see a death case, among
dozens coming to the Supreme Court
the] eve of execution petitions, in which
defendant was well represented at trial."
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg'
Justice Ginsburg made this remark in
2001, when speaking about the grave injustices
inadequate defense counsel creates. This prob-
lem is even more serious in the context of cap-
ital punishment, as it is literally a matter of life
and death. The death penalty represents the
ultimate punishment for those who have com-
mitted the worst offenses. Unfortunately, the
state often executes defendants who had the
worst lawyer instead of those who committed
the worst offenses. 2
This violates the Sixth Amendment,
which protects a defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel.3 It also violates the moral
requirements of retributivism, which demand
that the state punish offenders for their hei-
nous deeds and not for the incompetence of
their lawyers.
One striking example of this problem is
the story of Jerry White, who was on trial for
capital murder in Florida.5 The judge required
White's defense attorney to report for inspec-
' Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., In Pursuit of the Public
Good: Lawyers Who Care (Apr. 9, 2001).
2 Kenneth Williams, Ensuring the CapitalfDefendant's
Right to Competent Counsel It s Time for Some Standards,
51 WAYNE L. REV. 129, 131 (2005).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 Nelson T. Potter Jr., The Princile ofPunishment is
a Categoricallmperative, in AUTONOMY AND COMMUNITY:
READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY KANTIAN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
(Jane Kneller & Sidney Axinn eds., 1998).
' Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness:
The Constitutional Right to Effecti'e Assistance of Counsel
and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV.
425, 426 (1996); see White v. Florida, 664 So. 2d 242, 243
(1995).
tion in chambers each morning to see if he was
drunk or on drugs.' A witness later reported
that the defense attorney had used cocaine,
methamphetamines, marijuana, and morphine
during trial recesses.7 He also drank frequently.8
A man's life was at stake, and his defense was in
the hands of a man who needed daily inspec-
tions to ensure he was not too drunk or high to
function. Florida executed White in 1995. 9
White is one of many defendants whose
lawyers' incompetence had potentially lethal
consequences.'0 Judy Haney went to trial in
Alabama after having a hitman kill her abusive
husband." Hers was a sympathetic case there
were hospital records of his physical abuse of
both her and their children. 12 It is also rare
for someone who does away with their abusive
spouse to receive the death penalty. 3 Despite
these relatively favorable conditions, she re-
ceived a death sentence. 4 This is likely due in
part to the atrocious behavior of her lawyers.15
One of them was so drunk the court had to
temporarily delay Haney's trial and held him
in contempt for his conduct.6 The lawyers also
failed to find extant hospital records demon-
strating the abuse her husband had inflicted
on the family. 7 In addition, they failed to put
6 Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 426.
Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 426.
s Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 426.
9 Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 426.
10 Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor: The Death
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the WorstLawyer,
103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837 41 (1994) [hereinafter Bright,
Counselfor the Poor].
" Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1835 36.
12 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1835.
13 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1836.
But see Haney v. Alabama, 603 So. 2d 368 (Ct. Crim. App.
1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 925 (1993) (affirming a death
penalty conviction for a defendant who hired a hitman
to murder her husband).
14 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1836.
Is Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1835 36.
16 Bright, (ounseljor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1835.
Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1835.
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the defendant in contact with their expert
witness on domestic abuse until the night he
was supposed to testify on their behalf' This
incompetence likely contributed to Haney re-
ceiving an unusual death sentence. 19
A more recent example of the perils
of capital attorney incompetence is Maples c.
Thomas. In this case, the defendant's lawyers
quit and left their firm without filing his ap-
peal. 21 The defendant was not aware of this until
after the deadline for his appeal had expired.22
His new attorney explained that Alabama might
have executed this man for a careless bureau-
cratic oversight.23 In 2012, the Supreme Court
granted his habeas petition and remanded the
case.24 The Court held that he deserved anoth-
er chance in court after his lawyers abandoned
him. 25 His case remains ongoing.26
There are a litany of stories like these,
tales of lawyers entrusted with matters of life
and death who cannot be bothered to sober
up or do basic research on their client's case.27
s Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1835 36.
19 Bright, (Cunselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1835 36.
20 Supreme Court: Alabama Man Facing-Execution
Because Attorneys Left Without Filing Appeal, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https:Hdeathpenaltyinfo.org/
supreme -court- alabama-man -facing- execution -be-
cause -attorneys -left-without-filing- appeal.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266,289 90 (2012).
21 Id. at 288 89.
21 Maples v. Ala. Dep't of Corrections, 729 E App'x.
817, 820 (11th Cir. 2018) (vacating the conviction and
remanding the case).
21 See Robert R. Rigg, The TRex Without Teeth: Evol-
ing Strickland v. Washington and the Testfor Ineffectie
Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEEP. L. REV. 77, 91 (2008), Gary
Goodpaste, The Adversary System, Advocacy and Effec-
tie Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 62 63 (1986), and Bright, Counsel
for the Poor, supra note 10, at 1835, for heart-rending
stories of lawyer incompetence that caused death or
serious consequences.
There are also the well-meaning but hopeless-
ly overworked public defenders who genuine-
ly try to help their clients.28 They are overrun
with hundreds of indigent clients and simply
lack the time and funding to prepare a proper
capital defense.29 Still other capital defendants
receive appointed lawyers who know nothing
about the unique intricacies of a capital case.
They are thus woefully unprepared to ade-
quately represent their clients.30
This problem has repeatedly appeared
before the Supreme Court. The Court's juris-
prudence surrounding effective assistance of
counsel ultimately led to the case Strickland c.
Washington. In Strickland, the Court held that
a petitioner must demonstrate both incom-
petence by his attorney and that the incom-
petence likely prejudiced his trial in order to
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. 31 Courts are to measure deficiency by
the standard of a reasonable lawyer in the at-
torney's field of practice.32
While it sounds functional on paper, in
practice, this standard makes it nearly impos-
sible for petitioners to demonstrate deficient
performance by their attorney.33 Ineffective as-
sistance of counsel often means that attorneys
fail to preserve errors for appeal, making it dif-
ficult for an appellate court to see their inef-
fectiveness. 34 Even if an appellant manages to
demonstrate ineffectiveness of counsel, they
21 Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Bight to Counsel
in Criminal Cases: Still a National Crisis?, 86 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1564, 1578 79, 1603 (2018).
29 KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE'S JUSTICE 234 (2013).
30 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1842.
31 Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668,698 (1984).
32 Id. at 689.
33 See generally Rigg, supra note 27, at 84 94 (detailing
various key accounts of petitioners' struggle to over-
come the Strickland threshold).
34 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1862.
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still must prove that it prejudiced their trial.35
Courts are loathe to find that even egregious
errors prejudiced an accused. This means that
defendants, in particular capital defendants, of-
ten have no recourse when their lawyers have
given them a lukewarm and shoddy defense in-
stead of a zealous and thorough one.36
Another problem with this system is that
it violates the moral requirements of retributiv-
ism. IRetributivism demands that society pun-
ish offenders according to their just deserts.
The key to this approach that each individual
is responsible for his or her own actions and
should receive punishment or reward accord-
ingly.38 Thus, to give someone less punishment
than their crime warranted would be unjust, as
would punishing them for something they nev-
er did. 39 To punish capital defendants for the in-
eptitude of their lawyer the deeds of another
individual is thus abhorrent to a retributivist.
It is no more logical than executing someone
for a murder they did not commit. The current
system often executes the wrong offenders be-
cause of inadequate lawyering, which makes it
incompatible with retributivism.40
In addition to the injustice of punish-
ing the innocent (or meting out overly-harsh
punishments), it is also wrong to let those who
deserve execution live.4' Kant spoke extensive-
ly about the duty of a society to execute those
who deserve death. 2 The massive injustices
of the status quo create backlash against the
death penalty, prompting over-zealous attempts
3' Goodpaster supra note 27, at 64.
36 See Goodpasteg supra note 27, at 78.
3' ARTHUR SHUSTER, PUNISHMENT IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 11 (2016).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Williams, supra note 2, at 131.
41 SHU STER,supra note 37, at 86.
42 SHUSTER, Supra note 37, at 104.
at reform.43 The result is that some of those
who deserve to die live. The governor of Illi-
nois once went so far as to stop the execution
of every single inmate on Illinois' death row as
a result of the flaws in the system.44 While there
were some on death row who deserved to live,
there were also those whose deeds warranted
death as retribution. 5 It was an injustice to
spare them, and the present flawed system is to
blame for this travesty of justice. 6
Retributivism also mandates that the
state restrict its punitive power to those who
have voluntarily committed crimes. 47 This is be-
cause a society based upon personal liberty re-
quires that restraint.48 It is also because retrib-
utivism mandates that both institutions and
individuals accept the consequences of their
actions.49 Since the state's actions have drastic
effects on offenders' lives, it is responsible to
them. This includes responsibility for provid-
ing them with a fair trial.
Thus, this article argues that the status
quo of rampant ineffective assistance of coun-
sel in capital cases violates both Sixth Amend-
ment requirements and the moral demands of
retributivism. The Sixth Amendment mandates
assistance of counsel for criminal defendants. 50
Both logic and volumes of precedent dictate
43 See, e.g., Dan Markel, State, Be NotProud: A Retrib-
uticist Defense of the Commutations offDeath Row and the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R. -C.L. L. REV.
4o 7 , 408 (2oo5) (detailing Illinois governor's controver-
sial decision to commute several convicted criminals'
sentences).
44 Id. at 4 08 09.
41 SHUSTER,supra note 37, at 41.
46 SHUSTER,supra note 37, at 43.
41 See generally Anthony Duff & Andrew von Hirsch,
Responsibility, Retribution and the Voluntary: A Response
to Williarms, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. lO3 (1997) (questioning
whether universal morals should guide state activities
and institutions).
48 Duff & von Hirsch, supra note 47, at 105.
41 SHUSTER, supra note 37, at 102.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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that assistance of counsel means effective as-
sistance of counsel, so systemic ineffective
counsel for defendants is unconstitutional.5
It is also morally abhorrent under retributivist
penal principles. Retributivism calls for offend-
ers' punishment to be a result of their deeds.5 2
It also requires the state to take responsibility
for those whose liberty it truncates. Since in-
effective counsel results in offenders receiv-
ing punishment for another's incompetence, it
is incompatible with retributivism. Failure to
provide defendants with adequate counsel also
means that the state is abdicating the duty it
incurred when it took the defendant's liberty.
This is especially true in the context of
the death penalty, because any errors in matters
of life or death are final and irrevocable.5 3 In-
deed, the unique nature of death has prompted
the Supreme Court to impose unique restric-
tions upon the death penalty in the past.5 4 This
enormous problem will require both Congress
and state legislatures to provide adequate fund-
ing for the death penalty. It will also require
the Supreme Court to overturn Strickland and
implement a new standard for ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claims. This standard will
require the defendant to prove his lawyer made
errors "reflecting counsel's lack of skill, judg-
ment, or diligence."5 5 The burden of proof will
then be on the state to prove that these errors
were not prejudicial to the defendant's trial.56
"l McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
12 Duff & von Hirsch, supra note 47, at 107.
13 See William W. Berry III, More DJferent Than Lfe,
Less Different Than Death: The Argumentfor According
Life Without Parole Its Own Category ofHeightened Review
Under the Eighth Amendment After Graham v. Florida, 71
OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1111 n.3 (2010).
14 Berry, supra note 53, at 1111.
Haw. v. Aplaca, 837 P.2d 1298, 1305 (1992).
5 William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland ' Tin Horn:
Doctrinal andPractical Undermining of the Right to Loun-
sel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 165 (1995).
In Part I, this article will explore the
current problems with ineffective assistance of
counsel in capital cases. Part II will give a brief
overview of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
and explain how current Sixth Amendment
standards under Strickland are woefully lax
and therefore unconstitutional. Part II will also
demonstrate how this contributes to the prob-
lems in Part I by enabling them to continue. Part
III will explain retributivism and why it makes
effective assistance of counsel a moral impera-
tive, especially in capital cases. Finally, Part IV
will demonstrate how the depth and breadth
of this problem mean that it tramples on both
conservative and progressive values. This cre-
ates an incentive for a divided nation to unify
in solving the problem. Both the constitution-
al and moral arguments against the status quo
require legislatures to provide adequate fund-
ing for defense counsel. These arguments also
require the Supreme Court to overturn Strick-
land and replace it with a new standard. This
standard will make it easier for defendants to
demonstrate incompetence by their attorneys.
It will also require the government to prove a
lack of prejudice to the defendant once he or
she has established incompetence by their at-
torney.
I. THE PROBLEM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
A. An Overview of the Problem of Ineffective
Assistance of Counse
Fighting a criminal conviction in the
United States without an attorney is akin to
a ship navigating dangerous waters without
proper maps or navigational equipment. The
modern American legal system is complex and
difficult to navigate, with arcane rules of proce-
dure and evidence that would baffle even an in-
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telligent and well-educated layman.57 There is a
significant risk that even someone who is inno-
cent could receive a conviction simply because
they had no idea how to defend themselves. 58
The Founders recognized this problem
when dealing with a far less complex legal sys-
tem than the one in place today. They according-
ly enshrined the right to counsel into the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution.5 Ensuring the
right to counsel is thus crucial to the legitimacy
of a criminal conviction. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that this right is neces-
sary to obtain a valid criminal conviction. 0
Unfortunately, the current system of-
ten falls woefully short of the requirement of
effective assistance, especially in capital cas-
es. It is not uncommon for capital defendants
to receive extremely poor assistance from in-
competent lawyers, some of whom even admit
their own incompetence and seek permission
to withdraw.6' Many attorneys defending capi-
tal cases have little experience with them. They
therefore lack the specialized knowledge re-
quired to navigate the rules and procedures of
a death penalty trial.62 For example, a capital
trial involves unique processes for juror selec-
tion. Juror selection is crucial for the outcome
of a trial. An inexperienced lawyer who makes
mistakes at this phase of the proceedings could
thus condemn his client to death. 3
& Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
8 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (citing
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
" Stephanos Bibas & Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Sixth
Amendment, Constitution Center (last visited Dec. 20,
2019), https:Hconstitutioncenter.org/interactive-consti-
tution/interpretation/amendment-vi/interps/127.
60 Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467.
61 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1862.
di HOUPPERT, SUpra note 29, at 35.
63 Williams, supra note 2, at 134.
The lawyers defending capital cases are
often inexperienced. In some instances a judge
appoints them to defend a capital case after
they have only five days of legal practice behind
them.64 Even those attorneys who have trial ex-
perience may have such an overwhelming case
load that they cannot devote nearly enough
time to any individual case to adequately pre-
pare for trial. 5 This state of affairs is shocking
enough in non-capital cases, but in a death
penalty case someone's life is on the line.
While poor lawyering is not the only
problem in death penalty cases, the compe-
tence of a lawyer can often be the factor that
determines whether someone lives or dies.66
There are striking examples where two defen-
dants have virtually identical cases but only
the defendant with the better lawyer lives. 67
One such example is the case of John EldonSmith.6 8 Georgia executed him despite a vio-
lation of his Constitutional rights in the case.9
His lawyer was apparently ignorant of this mat-
ter.70 Conversely, his codefendant received a
new trial because of the exact same constitu-
tional issue.7 He ultimately received only a life
sentence, thanks in part to his lawyer's superior
knowledge. 2
Georgia bears the grim distinction
of hosting another such injustice soon after
Smith's case.7 3 A mentally disabled defendant
lost his case after a jury instruction that un-
constitutionally flipped the burden of proof 1
64 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1862.
6& HOUPPERT,SUpra note 29, at 33 34.
66 Williams, supra note 2, at 133.
6 Williams, supra note 2, at 131.
68 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1839 40.
69 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1840.
0 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1840.
Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1840.
12 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1840.
13 Bright, (ounseljor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1859.
14 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1859.
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Because his lawyer did not preserve the error
for appeal, he did not receive relief and Geor-
gia executed him.7 5 His codefendant, who had
a higher level of culpability, received a new tri-
al over the same issue.7 6 This is another situa-
tion where the defendants' lawyers, not their
blameworthiness, determined their respective
sentences. Another illustrative example of how
a trial can hinge on quality lawyering is the trial
of Robert Durst. A Texas jury acquitted Durst
for killing and dismembering his elderly neigh-
bor, then dumping the body in a river. Durst
claimed self-defense. Durst was the son of a
wealthy New York real estate magnate, and was
able to hire an expensive legal team. This en-
abled him to escape charges that would have
sent someone with lesser means to prison, if
not death row.77 Consider what would likely
have happened if Durst had received an inex-
perienced and over-worked public defender
instead of an expensive team of lawyers. It is
highly unlikely that a jury would have acquit-
ted him for killing his neighbor, chopping apart
his body with an ax, then dumping it in a river
in "elf-defense" without elite lawyers to sell
the story. This strange case helps to illustrate
that the quality of one's lawyers, and not one's
deeds, often determines the level of punish-
ment afforded to a defendant.
Such cases serve to illustrate the prob-
lems within the death penalty system gener-
ally. The presence of a codefendant in some
cases allows for precise side-by-side compari-
sons that demonstrate the danger of ineffective
counsel. Other cases show that a good lawyer
can sell a defendant's dubious self-defense
" Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1859.
16 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1859.
" Meghan Keneally et al., Why Robert D urst Killed His
Neig hbor in His Own Words, ABC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2015),
https:Habcnews.go.com/US/robert-durst-killed-neigh-
bor-words/story?id 29689667; Williams, supra note 2, at
129 31.
claim after mutilating his elderly neighbor
with an ax. These instances illustrate that "it is
better to be rich and guilty than poor and in-
nocent." When cases hinge on lawyer perfor-
mance, incompetent lawyering can condemn
someone to death regardless of their deeds.7 8 A
key factor enabling this problem to continue is
the lax standards the Supreme Court set forth
in Strickland v. Washington. 9
B. How Strickland Enables Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
The Supreme Court held in Strickland
that in order to prevail on an ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must
prove that his attorney acted in a manner that
no reasonable attorney would, and that this
incompetence so prejudiced his case that the
results would likely have been different but-for
this unreasonable behavior.80 The Court made
it clear from the start that they intended this
standard to be "highly deferential" to lawyers,
and that it would be a difficult burden for of-
fenders to meet.8'
Subsequent cases have entrenched this
deference to lawyers. In Harrington v. Ri chter,
the Court reiterated that their approach to law-
yers is a "most deferential one," and that there
is a "strong presumption" in favor of the law-
yers whose performance they review.8 2 This
strong presumption makes prevailing on inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims a daunting
task. In the decades following the decision, it
became apparent that the burden of Strickland
was almost impossible for defendants to over-
s Williams, supra note 2, at 130 31.
9 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1858.
s Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,699 700
(1984).
8 Id. at 689.
62 Harrington v. Richter, 662 U.S. 86, 105,105 (2011)
(quoting Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)).
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come.83 Justice Blackmun criticized Strickland
for creating a high burden that fails to protect
the rights of petitioners.8" Other factors, such
as the poverty of many defendants and diffi-
culty of conducting appeals from prison make
this situation even worse. Poor defendants of-
ten cannot afford counsel capable of navigating
the appeals process. Even when good counsel
is available, coordinating a case from prison is
difficult, and deadlines are easy to miss.8 5 All of
this combined makes claims of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel almost impossible to win.86
A case where the defendant successful-
ly prevailed on an ineffective assistance claim
demonstrates the extreme difficulty of doing
so. The defendant's attorney in Buck (,. Dacs
introduced an expert who testified that the de-
fendant was more likely to reoffend because
he was black.87 The Supreme Court held that
knowingly introducing evidence so incredibly
damaging to one's own client was outside the
bounds of what any reasonable lawyer would
do.88 The defendant's appeal thus satisfied the
first prong of the Strickland test, and the Court
found that he had received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.8 9
Although the outcome of Buck ,. Dats
was correct, it illustrates the extreme difficulty
of prevailing under Strickland. It took the de-
fendant's lawyer making an incredible blun-
der to reach this standard. It is also telling that
the issue of race came up this is an extreme-
ly sensitive topic. The fact that it required the
lawyer to make such an obvious mistake with
such a taboo issue to help the defendant suc-
3 Williams, supra note 2, at 139.
8 Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 438.
s Goodpaster;supra note 27, at 79 80.
86 Goodpaster; supra note 27, at 79.
8 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776 77 (2017).
Id. at 776.
9 Id. at 775.
ceed shows just how high a burden Strickland
presents. What makes the situation even more
worrisome is that numerous trial and appellate
courts in Texas upheld this miscarriage of jus-
tice before it reached the Supreme Court.9
Other cases where the defendant's claim
was unsuccessful further illustrate this point.
In Strickland itself, the defendant's attorney de-
cided not to present key mitigating evidence on
his behalf.9' The Court held that this arguable
failure was a merely a strategic decision.92 In
Wheat (,. Johnson, a psychiatrist found the de-
fendant was delusional. 93 Subsequent MIII evi-
dence revealed an empty cavity in a part of his
brain regulating impulse and aggression. The
psychiatrist was willing to testify that the defen-
dant was insane at the time of his crimes, and
this was the "only viable defense available."95
The lawyer decided not to have the psychiatrist
testify, which occluded his client's best hope.96
The Fifth Circuit held that this did not con-
stitute ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland.97
Even if one accepts the core assumption
of Strickland and grants its unspoken premise
that trial attorneys almost invariably deserve the
benefit of the doubt, this situation would still
be grim. Death is final and irrevocable, so even
one instance of a defendant dying because of
an attorney's incompetence would be a blight
upon the justice system. But the situation is far
worse there is little basis for Strickland's key
assumption that trial lawyers are overwhelm-
9I Id. at 767 69.
91 Williams, supra note 2, at 138.
92 Williams, supra note 2, at 140.
I d. at 140; Wheat v. Johnson, 238 E3d 357, 362 63
(5th Cir. 2001).
14 Wheat, 238 E3d at 362 63.
" Id. at 363.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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ingly competent.98 Indeed, even the justice who
wrote Strickland conceded this point and wrote
a scathing piece on the prevalence of trial law-
yer incompetence. 99 Thus, Strickland's extreme
deference to attorney performance is unwar-
ranted, as it has no basis in fact.'00
Strickland's false assumptions about at-
torney competence serve to enable deep-rooted
problems in the criminal justice system. Recall
the host of problems surrounding ineffective
assistance of counsel in criminal cases un-
derfunded, overworked, and inexperienced
lawyers all of which point to deep flaws in the
system.'0 ' By setting such an incredibly high
bar for defendants to overcome and granting
lawyers an unwarranted amount of deference,
Strickland allows these problems to continue,
which defrauds defendants of their right to
counsel. This is a travesty when it occurs in any
case. It is especially egregious in capital cases,
when attorney incompetence can mean not
only loss of liberty, but life itself.
Strickland's requirement that petition-
ers show prejudice to their case makes this
situation even worse. Even if defendants can
demonstrate that their lawyers were ineffective,
Strickland requires them to prove that this prej -
udiced their case. This is a significant problem.
It implicitly contradicts much earlier prece-
dent, notably Hamilton c. State ofAlabama.'0 2 In
Hamilton, the Court explained that when some-
one lacks counsel (or, by logical extension, ef-
fective counsel), "the degree of prejudice can
never be known."'0 3 That which "can never be
known" is almost impossible to prove.10 4 The
s Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1863.
9 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1863.
100 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1863.
101 HOUPPERT, supra note 29, at 33 35.
102 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 52 (1961).
"'3 Id. at 57.
104 See id.
Supreme Court therefore requires petitioners
to prove something they admitted someone
cannot prove.
One reason for this is that what is miss-
ing" from the record is often the crucial factor
that prejudiced a case.10 5 For example, a major
mistake of incompetent counsel is failing to
preserve errors on the record for appeal. 0 6 If
the error is not on the record, there is scant
evidence of it, and little recourse for those it
harms., This means that it is difficult to prove,
and difficult to act upon if one can prove it.
Another frequent error is failure to investigate
important avenues of evidence or witness tes-
timony.' 7 Incompetent attorneys have failed
to investigate alibi witnesses for their clients,
damaging their cases irreparably.' 8 Since the
problem is what did not happen, there is little
or no record of it.'09 Although these mistakes
likely did prejudice the defendant's case, it
will be almost impossible for the defendant to
prove any of it on appeal. 110
Strickland's problems thus mean in prac-
tice that defendants can only prevail on inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims in the most
extreme cases."' Courts will rationalize an at-
torney's oversights as tactical decisions, even
when the attorney stated that they were not.112
Even if the defendant manages to overcome
this prong of Strickland, he or she still must
10' Williams, supra note 2, at 138.
106 Williams, supra note 2, at 137.
10' Stephen B. Bright, The Right to Counsel in Death
Penalty and Other Criminal Cases: Neglect of the Most Fun-
damentalRight and What We ShouldDo About It, 11 J.L.
Soc'Y 1, 17 (2010) [hereinafter Bright, Right to Counsel].
10' Williams, supra note 2, at 137.
10' Williams, supra note 2, at 137.
110 Williams, supra note 2, at 137.
111 Williams, supra note 2, at 137.
112 Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standardfor
Claims of Ineffectice Assistance of Counsel Emasculating the
Sixth Amendment in the Guise ofDue Process, 134 U. PENN.
L. REV 1259, 1271 (1986).
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prove that the errors prejudiced the case."'
The Supreme Court has admitted that this is
virtually impossible. 114 Justice Marshall pointed
this out in his scathing dissent in Strickland.115
Thus, claimants can only prevail in the most
egregious cases such as Buck c. Dacis, where the
defense attorney calls an expert who testifies
against the defendant."'
Conversely, claimants whose attorneys'
performances were deficient, but not egre-
giously deficient enough to overcome the hur-
dles of Strickland will have no recourse."' If the
attorney's performance was of dubious compe-
tence but not glaringly mistaken, the courts will
likely rationalize any mistakes or oversights as
strategic choices." 8 Even if the attorney's errors
are so obvious that a court will acknowledge
their existence, the defendant must still prove
prejudice."' The Supreme Court has admitted
that proving prejudice is nearly impossible. 120
The practical result of this is that courts brush
over volumes of attorney error and treat defen-
dants as if they are guilty either way.
Strickland's standard thus creates a
massive burden for anyone seeking to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel. By making
its existence hard to prove, Strickland enables
this problem to continue without recourse for
those it harms.
113 Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1260.
114 See Hamilton 368 U.S. at 55.
... Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707 08 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
116 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777 (2017).
11 Williams, supra note 2, at 139.
... Williams, supra note 2, at 139.
... Williams, supra note 2, at 139.
120 See Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 55.
II. STRICKLAND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Strickland enables a system that denies
defendants effective assistance of counsel. The
Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution grants defendants the right to counsel,
and this necessarily entails a right to effective
assistance of counsel. 12' Thus, a criminal justice
system that denies defendants the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel is unconstitution-
al because it violates the Sixth Amendment.
Since Strickland enables this unconstitutional
status quo via its loose standards, it is therefore
unconstitutional.
The right to effective assistance of coun-
sel is a logical consequence of the right to as-
sistance of counsel. To argue otherwise would
be absurd there is no purpose to assigning
a defendant an attorney if that attorney does
not effectively help the defendant. This would
be akin to proclaiming that someone has the
right to free speech, but not allowing them to
say anything. Thus, the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel is logically concomitant with
the right to counsel.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly ac-
knowledged this in numerous cases. Indeed,
the Court even went so far as to reiterate it in
Strickland itself.122 Quoting McMann c. Richard-
son, the Court emphasized that "the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance
of counsel."'12' The Court in McMann explained,
"defendants facing felony charges are entitled
to the effective assistance of competent coun-
sel" because "if the right to counsel guaranteed
by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, de-
121 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
122 Id.
121 Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
(1970)).
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fendants cannot be left to the mercies of in-
competent counsel."'124
Criminal defendants thus have a consti-
tutional right to effective assistance of coun-
sel. 125 Yet the current criminal justice system is
rife with ineffective assistance of counsel. In-
deed, the quality of one's lawyer has become
determinative in many criminal cases. 126 The
justice system consequently executes many
capital defendants due to the poor quality of
counsel their lawyers provided. 12 This denies
them their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
This endemic ineffectiveness is unconstitu-
tional, because each of those defendants had
a right to effective assistance of counsel.128As
demonstrated in Part I, Strickland enables this
system to continue by making it difficult for
defendants to prevail on ineffective assistance
claims, even when their case is valid. 129 Strick-
land's two-prong test imposes an enormous
burden of proof on defendants. 30 It requires
them to prove ineffectiveness on the part of
124 McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14. The Court noted that,
"[s] ince Gideon v. Wainwright (citation omitted), it has
been clear that a defendant pleading guilty to a felony
charge has a federal right to the assistance of counsel."
Id.
125 Id.
126 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1839 40.
121 See Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at
1837 41. A similar problem exists in civil cases, and
the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to hold that
civil litigants have a right to counsel. See, e.g. Lassiter
v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).With many
civil cases making life-changing determinations such
as losing a home or even receiving jail time for civil
contempt, this problem extends beyond the criminal
justice side of the American legal system. See Robert
Hornstein, The ightt to Counsel in 01911 Cases Recisited:
The Proper Influence ofPoverty and the Case for Reversing
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 59 Cath. U.
L. Rev. 1057 (2010) (arguing that due process concerns
remain compelling reasons for court-appointed repre-
sentation in civil cases).
128 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12 Bright, Right to Counsel, supra note 107, at 18.
130 Bright, Rigtt to Counsel, supra note 107, at 22.
their lawyer.' Proving ineffectiveness by the
lawyer post-facto is an incredibly difficult task.
One of the key mistakes ineffective lawyers
make is a failure to preserve key errors for ap-
peal. 3 2 This makes it difficult to demonstrate
their ineptitude, because the trial court's re-
cord will be devoid of the necessary evidence. 133
Even if a defendant manages to adduce
the necessary evidence, the Supreme Court was
explicit that the Strickland standard is "high-
ly deferential" to attorneys. 13 This means that
courts will find that the attorney was not inef-
fective, even in the face of evidence to the con-
trary.135 The deference to lawyers often results
in appellate courts creating post-hoc rational-
izations of attorneys' errors and neglect as tac-
tical decisions. 13 6 Even if a defendant manages
to overcome the first hurdle of Strickland, they
must also demonstrate that their lawyer's errors
prejudiced their trial. The Supreme Court pre-
viously acknowledged that prejudice from inef-
fective assistance of counsel is unknowable. 37
What one cannot know, one cannot prove. This
tasks defendants with proving something that
is impossible to prove. Even when defendants
can adduce evidence to this effect, courts are
hesitant to find that prejudice occurred. 38 This
allows the flaws in the system to continue,
with no consequences for anyone save for the
hapless defendants whose inadequate lawyers
doom them to death or incarceration.
Strickland thus places a massive burden
upon petitioners who seek to demonstrate a vi-
olation of their rights. The result is that Strick-
131 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1862.
132 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1862.
133 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1862.
134 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669.
131 Williams, supra note 2, at 138.
136 Williams, supra note 2, at 140 41.
13' Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 55.
138 Rigg, supra note 27, at 87.
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land's harsh standard serves to deny defendants
their Sixth Amendment rights, because it effec-
tively blocks their recourse when their counsel
was ineffective. 3 9
This undermines the entire purpose of
the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment
exists to ensure that each defendant receives a
fair trial. 140 James Madison made it clear that
the "prerequisites" of a fair trial were necessary
to secure the rights of the people.' 4'These pre-
requisites included the right to assistance of
counsel. 4 2 In other words, effective assistance
of counsel is a necessary condition for a fair tri-
al.143 Thus, to deny a defendant effective assis-
tance of counsel is to undermine the Founders'
purpose of the Sixth Amendment a fair trial
to preserve the liberty of the people. 14 4
Denying a defendant their Sixth Amend-
ment rights creates a Constitutional problem
extending far beyond the Sixth Amendment. 45
As Justice Brennan said, a key role of the Sixth
Amendment is "to give substance to other con-
stitutional and procedural protections afforded
criminal defendants."'46 Due to the complex na-
ture of today's legal system, asserting the pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights often requires the
assistance of counsel. 147 Thus, denying a defen-
dant effective assistance of counsel taints the
criminal procedure with potential violations of
numerous Constitutional rights.4 8
139 Rigg, supra note 27, at 87.
140 Randolph N. Jonakait, Notesfor a Consistent and
Meaningful Sixth Amendment, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLO-
GY 713, 717 (1992).
141 Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1268.
142 Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1268. These prerequisites
also included other rights encapsulated in the Sixth
Amendment, such as the right to a jury trial. Id.
143 Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1268.
144 Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1268.
14' Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1268.
146 Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1268.
14' Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1261.
14' Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1268.
Strickland harsh burden of proof serves
to enable ineffective assistance of counsel by
making it almost impossible to "prove" under
Strickland's test.1 9 This allows ineffective law-
yering to continue unabated, with the con-
sequent violation of ever-more defendants'
rights.15 0 Strickland's current test is therefore
unconstitutional, because it allows the criminal
justice system to continually undermine the
entire purpose of the Bill of Rights.'5 '
III. THE STATUS QUO Is INCOMPATIBLE
WITH RETRIBUTTVISM
Not only does this system violate defen-
dants' Constitutional rights, it is fundamen-
tally immoral. Retributivism provides a moral
basis for rejecting the status quo. This stems
from retributivism's analysis of what it is to be
human. 5 2 To a retributivist such as Immanuel
Kant, an essential part of what made someone
human was possessing the ability to reason. 153
A result of this rationality was the ability to ap-
preciate the consequences of one's actions. 5 4
Man's capacity to reason thus demands that
society treat every individual as a rational be-
ing (with obvious exceptions for people such
as children and the mentally disabled) who is
capable of making their own decisions and ac-
cepting the consequences. 5 5
Thus, those who work should receive
a wage, and those who commit crimes should
receive punishment. To deny a worker their
fairly earned wages would be unjust, because
those wages are a consequence of that per-
149 Williams, supra note 2, at 133.
so Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1261.
ll Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1261.
112 SHUSTER, supra note 37, at 111.
l1 SHUSTER, supra note 37, at 111.
I14 SHUSTER, supra note 37, at 118.
laa SHUSTER, supra note 37, at 133.
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son's freely chosen actions. Likewise, to deny
an offender their punishment is wrong, as the
penalty is a consequence of their freely chosen
actions. 5 6 Indeed, failing to properly punish
an offender is dehumanizing, because to do so
constitutes a refusal to accept their status as a
rational being who chose the consequences of
their actions.' 7 This is akin to treating them as
an animal that lacks the intelligence to make
informed decisions.15 8
Retributivism therefore demands that
the state give offenders the just deserts for
their deeds, because punishing them for any-
thing else is unjust L5 9 This is because retribu-
tivism justifies punishment via the criminal's
rational acceptance of the consequences of his
actions. 160 Since the current American capital
punishment system punishes offenders for
having bad lawyers, it punishes them for the ac-
tions of another.16 1 This is as unjust as locking
someone up for a crime their neighbor com-
mitted. Further, it severs the causal chain be-
tween crime and punishment, which is the en-
tire reason capital punishment is legitimate. 162
Retributivism justifies punishment as a fair and
proportionate consequence that offenders ra-
tionally accept as a risk of committing crimes. 163
Since retributivism incorporates pro-
portionality as a key tenet of its justification of
punishment, it follows that only proportionate
punishments are just.L6 4 Proportional means
1' C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory ofPunishment,
13 ISSUES IN RELIGION & PSYCHOTHERAPY 147, 147 (1987),
https:Hscholarsarchive.byu.edu/egi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle 1271&context irp.
Is SHUSTER, supra note 37, at 105.
laB SHUSTER, supra note 37, at 105.
9 Lewis, supra note 156, at 148.
160 Potter supra note 4, at 106.
161 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1839.
162 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938).
163 SHUSTER, supra note 37, at 104.
164 Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy
ofPunishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 55, 56 (1992).
that the punishment is neither too harsh nor
too lax in relation to the crime in question. 165
Since death is a proportionate consequence
for those who have deliberately taken the lives
of others in particularly blameworthy ways,
and people who commit these acts are aware
of and accept the consequences, retributivism
provides a legitimate basis for meting out cap-
ital punishment. 166 Since penalties must be
both a result of and proportionate to offend-
ers' crimes, it follows that those who commit
particularly heinous crimes should receive the
death penalty.167
This is because proportionality acts
to moderate punishment ordinally. In other
words, it does not provide its own complete
framework, but can set upper and lower limits
on a society's punishments. 168 Since Americans
have chosen to keep death as the ultimate sanc-
tion, proportionality dictates that American so-
ciety reserve it for the worst offenders. 169 Dem-
ocratic principles of retribution warrant this
use of societal norms to justify a punishment.7 0
Scholars such as Dan Markel explain that de-
mocracy is a key aspect of retributivism.' This
is because one element of retribution is com-
municating society's values to offenders. 172
Conversely, offenders whose acts, while
immoral, are relatively less blameworthy should
not receive the ultimate sanction. 173 Thus, it is
unjust when less culpable defendants like Judy
Haney receive capital punishment based upon
their lawyers' ineptitude, while murderers who
committed much more atrocious crimes receive
165 von Hirsch, supra note 164, at 56.
166 von Hirsch, supra note 164, at 79.
167 von Hirsch, supra note 164, at 60.
168 von Hirsch, supra note 164, at 75.
169 von Hirsch, supra note 164, at 58.
170 Markel, supra note 43, at 432.
171 Markel, supra note 43, at 432.
172 Markel, supra note 43, at 415.
173 von Hirsch, supra note 164, at 62.
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a mere life sentence. 74 There is no proportional
relationship between the offense and punish-
ment when the skill of one's lawyer determines
the severity of one's punishment. Since this
proportionality is a fundamental requirement
of the punishment's legitimacy, this disconnect
between offense and punishment delegitimizes
the death penalty.'75
Since the death penalty is a legitimate
means of punishing offenders, it is detrimental
to the justice system to allow flaws that delegit-
imize it to continue. Just as it is wrong to pun-
ish someone for something they did not do, it
is wrong to allow them to receive less than their
deserved punishment. The current problems in
the system serve to delegitimize the death pen-
alty and therefore prompt pushback against it.
Another similar case is when the Illinois gover-
nor commuted the sentence of every offender
on Illinois' death row. 7 6 This is wrong, as there
are now offenders who deserve death but will
never receive it. I77
Another logical consequence of retrib-
utivism is that it imposes an obligation on
the government to provide adequate defense
counsel for those who cannot afford it. 8 This
stems from the idea that individuals and en-
tities are responsible for their own actions. 179
1S4 See Haney v. Alabama, 603 So. 2d 368, 379 (Ct. Crim.
App. 1991).
"' Markel, supra note 43, at 437.
116 Markel, supra note 43, at 437. Again, Markel would
almost certainly disagree with my contention that abol-
ishing the death penalty is a negative thing. Neverthe-
less, the information in his article is useful.
"' SHUSTER, supra note 37, at 102. As Kant said, even if
a society were to voluntarily dissolve itself, it would be
the duty of its members to execute the last murderer
in their prison before they left. Id. However given the
existence of mitigating circumstances, a modern society
might not wish to execute every murderer. Still, the idea
that it is unjust to spare those who deserve death holds
true.
1"' See von Hirsch, supra note 164, at 79.
179 von Hirsch, supra note 164, at 79.
When someone does a deed, they accept the
consequences and responsibilities that stem
from that action.8 0 Since the United States is a
society predicated upon individual liberty, the
government incurs a responsibility to defen-
dants when it deprives them of their liberty. 8'
The government must only punish those
who "voluntarily break the law" in a free soci-
ety.82 The state must restrict its use of coercive
power to these wrongdoers because to do oth-
erwise would trample on its citizens' liberty.18 3
In an adversary system, effective counsel is nec-
essary to determine whether the defendant has
in fact transgressed the law.184 Because of this
system, the government accepts the responsi-
bility to provide counsel to those who cannot
afford it when it deprives them of their liberty.
The government incurs this hefty re-
sponsibility when it deprives defendants of
their liberty yet spares their lives. This respon-
sibility increases when lives are on the line be-
cause, as the Supreme Court is wont to note,
"Death is Different."'85 Death is an irrevoca-
ble punishment. Any responsibility one incurs
from depriving someone of liberty (which one
can at least partly restore) is magnified when
death enters the equation.
Ineffective assistance of counsel in
death penalty cases thus creates multiple mor-
al travesties: Execution of innocent (and com-
paratively less guilty) defendants, and sparing
offenders who deserve death. 186 Neither group
is receiving punishment (or relative lenience)
based upon their deeds. Retributivism also im-
180 Lewis, supra note 156, at 148.
181 von Hirsch, supra note 164, at 74.
182 Duff & von Hirsch, supra note 47, at 104.
13 Duff & von Hirsch, supra note 47, at 103.
184 Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 54.
Is' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Bren
nan, J., concurring); Berry, supra note 53, at 1111.
186 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 10, at 1839.
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poses a moral obligation on the government to
provide assistance of counsel when it deprives
offenders of their liberty.'87 Thus, retributivism
requires effective assistance of counsel, espe-
cially in capital cases.
IV. A SOLUTION THAT OFFERS SOMETHING
FOR EVERYONE
As grim as the problem appears, its
sheer enormity may be beneficial. The issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel seems insur-
mountable, with so many disparate problems
feeding into a complex and tangled nightmare
of massive proportions. Yet the pervasiveness of
this problem is a boon, because it is so exten-
sive that it violates principles sacred to people
on both the left and right of the political spec-
trum. Solving it therefore grants Americans an
opportunity to bridge ideological differences
and unite behind a common cause of justice.
A. Appeal to Conservatives
American conservatives deeply value
following the Founders' beliefs for the Consti-
tution and preserving the rights therein.'88 This
group frequently speaks out when government
overreach infringes on the rights in the First
and Second Amendments. This stems from a
strong belief in individual liberty and the ac-
companying suspicion of government power
and its ability to tread on the rights of Amer-
icans. 8 9 Conservatives often speak out when
187 von Hirsch, supra note 164, at 74.
18 See generally Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too
Conservative? 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 29 (1991) (argu-
ing that originalism is a principled theory of constitu-
tional interpretation).
189 Rod Dreher, Individualism and Conservatisrm, AM.
CONSERVATIVE ONLINE (Aug. 31, 2012), https:/theameri-
canconservative.com/Dreher/individualism-and-conser-
vatism.
government regulation interferes with some-
one's individual rights.'90
The current criminal justice system
deprives offenders of all three and does so
in a manner that violates their constitutional
rights.'9 ' Defendants' only line of defense be-
tween them and the leviathan of government
power is often their attorney.9 2 The Found-
ers recognized this, and thus wrote the Sixth
Amendment. 9 3 Anyone who claims to believe in
individual liberty and values the Bill of Rights
should thus oppose violations of the rights in
the Sixth Amendment and vigorously support
effective assistance of counsel.
In addition, conservatives often possess
a strong sense of justice which corresponds
with retributivism. Their individualistic belief
system aligns with a penal philosophy that fo-
cuses on the merits of the individual. 94 They
often support the death penalty because they
believe that people who commit the worst of-
fenses should receive the ultimate sanction as
retribution for their actions. '9 With their strong
belief in treating individuals according to their
merits, conservatives will rankle at the thought
of punishing people for their attorney's actions.
Conservatives can thus support the idea
of reforming assistance of counsel. Indeed, to
allow the status quo to continue should be
anathema to them, as it entails a massive gov-
ernment overreach trampling upon the indi-
vidual rights and Constitutional system the
Founders established. It also means letting
some offenders off, while those undeserving of
190 Id.
191 Jonakait, supra note 140, at 746.
192 Jonakait, supra note 140, at 732.
193 Bibas & Fisher, supra note 59.
194 Dreher, supra note 189.
19' Matt K. Lewis, The Conservative Case for CapitalPun-
1 shment, THE WEEK (May 1, 2014), https:Htheweek.com/
articles/447348/conservative -case -capital -punishment.
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the ultimate punishment die unjustly, both of
which offend conservative principles.
B. Appeal to Progressives
On the other side of the aisle, the pro-
gressive left has made criminal justice reform
one of its key issues. 9 6 Progressive thinkers
value equality in criminal justice and seek to
make the legal system more accessible and eq-
uitable to the poor and minority groups. 7 The
status quo of ineffective assistance of counsel
creates massive inequalities injustice and has a
particularly heavy impact on poor and minority
defendants.198
A system that executes people who have
not the worst records, but the worst lawyers, fa-
vors those who can simply buy their way out
of justice. It also punishes lower-income defen-
dants who cannot afford the high-priced law-
yers one often needs to prevail.'9 9 Progressive
groups value equal justice and equal treatment
for all.200 This system which blatantly favors the
rich and disenfranchises the poor is thus anti-
thetical to the social justice progressives seek
in the justice system.2 '
In addition to the economic inequal-
ity that ineffective assistance of counsel pro-
mulgates, the flaws in the system hit minority
groups particularly hard. African -Americans
are far more likely to receive the death penalty
than white offenders. Progressive thinkers see
this as evidence of deeper racial inequalities and
196 Hugo A. Bedau, The Case Against the Death Penalty
ACLU (2012), https://www.aclu.org/other/case-against-
death-penalty.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Williams, supra note 2, at 131.
20U Bedau, supra note 196.
201 Bedau, supra note 196.
prejudices in the American system.2 2 Ineffective
assistance of counsel thus contributes to this is-
sue, giving progressives ample incentive to sup-
port a solution.
Ineffective assistance of counsel is
problem stemming from multiple issues that
are deeply rooted in the justice system. The
solution will thus require a multi-pronged ap-
proach, notably from legislatures and courts. It
will first require extensive funding, and then
the Supreme Court must overturn Strickland
and establish a new standard for ineffective as-
sistance of counsel.
C. Financial Solutions from Legislatures
Money remains one of the key problems
with ineffective assistance of counsel. Many
public defender offices are woefully under-
funded, if they exist at all. Courts also some-
times appoint counsel which is not from a pub-
lic defender office. This counsel is also heavily
underfunded, in some cases paid below min-
* 20imum wage. 03 The adversary system depends
upon zealous advocacy from both sides if it is
to function at all.20 ' Given the sheer expense
of investigating and trying a case, this requires
well-funded attorneys on both sides. Hiring ex-
perts, paying paralegals to help with research,
and simply compensating lawyers for their time
soon adds up to thousands of dollars. 205 Pay be-
low minimum wage, or the allocation of tiny
amounts such as S500 for all experts and out-
side help, will not suffice. Indeed, no amount
of strict standards for competence will matter
202 Bedau, supra note 196. The various political factions
are likely to disagree as to why this is. That is immaterial
to this argument. The point here is that the problem of
ineffective assistance of counsel creates issues that are
offensive to both sides' values.
203 Williams, supra note 2, at 146.
2o" Gabriel, supra note 112, at 1270.
20 HOUPPERT, supra note 29, at 5.
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if there is no financial support to for good law-
yers to remain in defense positions.
This means that state legislatures must
allocate sufficient funds to underfunded pub-
lic defenders where they exist. They must also
create public defender offices where there are
none, and then adequately fund them. There
must be enough funds to keep public defend-
ers in their jobs, to prevent the problem of
experienced lawyers leaving as soon as possi-
ble. It also means that there must be enough
public defenders so that they are not massively
overworked.2 6 This will in turn require hiring
enough people for the job.
The exact pay amount must be a local
matter. What might be enough to live comfort-
ably in rural Alabama might not be enough
for a small apartment in an expensive city like
Washington, D.C. What matters is that public
defenders (or external lawyers appointed to
cases) receive pay sufficient to incentive them
to remain in the position and prioritize defend-
ing their clients.
This aspect of the solution might re-
quire significant expenditure, especially in the
beginning. However, it has the potential to save
money in the long term. Botched cases result
in clogging of the court system and a lengthy
appeals process, both of which drain the public
coffers. With competent counsel on both sides,
the system would be far more efficient, which
will result in fewer delays and fewer protracted
appeals. In addition, both incarceration and ex-
ecutions are incredibly expensive. For example,
Dr. Ernest Gost estimates that the death penal-
ty costs states $23.2 million per year more than
states without it.20 Thus, not executing those
206 HOUPPERT, Supra note 29, at 13.
207 ERNEST GOSS ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE
DEATH PENALTY ON THE STATE OF NEBRASKA: A TAXPAYER
BURDEN? 21 (2016).
whose deeds do not merit death will be a finan-
cial boon in addition to a moral obligation.
Even if funding defense counsel did not
save the system any money, it is still a constitu-
tional and moral obligation. The Constitution
requires effective assistance of counsel as part
of the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights (see
Part II). There is no way to achieve this without
sufficient funds.2 8
In addition, effective assistance of coun-
sel is a moral requirement of retributivism.
Since the adversary system depends upon both
sides' zealous advocacy, and this in turn re-
quires funding, reaching a just result that pun-
ishes offenders for the merits of their deeds
necessitates adequate defense funding. Indeed,
the government incurs this responsibility to
defendants when it deprives them of their life
or liberty (See Part III). Thus, retributivism re-
quires adequate funding for defendants.
Adequate funding will go a long way to-
wards solving the problem of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. One of the key problems in
public defense work is that as soon as a law-
yer gains any experience, he or she leaves for
a more lucrative field as soon as possible.2 9
Offering these young attorneys a competitive
wage will ensure that they remain in the field
after gaining the experience necessary to rep-
resent clients well.
Investigating a case is expensive. One of
the recurring issues of ineffective assistance of
counsel is that attorneys fail to investigate the
case thoroughly. Providing adequate funding
will allow them to thoroughly investigate cases,
without having to work on unreasonable bud-
gets.210 Another problem with investigating cas -
208 Williams, supra note 2, at 150.
209 HOUPPERT, supra note 29, at 250.
210 HOUPPERT, supra note 29, at 34.
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es is the lack of time, as many of these attorneys
are heavily overworked.]
Public defenders especially, often have
caseloads twice those of other lawyers. This
leaves them with precious little time to prepare
or thoroughly investigate their cases. Indeed,
they barely have time to address even the most
rudimentary elements of a case, let alone parse
out potential mitigating factors and other po-
tential defense for capital clients. Sufficient
funding for public defender offices will allow
them to hire more attorneys, and thus relieve
the workload. This, in turn, will give each at-
torney more time to invest in each case, and
therefore they will be more able to investigate
each defendant's case.
Adequate funding will therefore help
solve the key issues of incompetent lawyers and
inadequate investigation and preparation by
the defense. It will allow public defender offic-
es to retain experienced practitioners. Another
benefit will be ensuring adequate funding and
personnel to thoroughly investigate a case.
D. Court-Imposed Standards
Once there is available funding, courts
will have a crucial role in the massive system
overhaul needed to provide effective assistance
of counsel. Although the problem extends far
beyond lax standards, the low bar for effective-
ness enables the problem. (See Parts II & III). To
solve this, the Supreme Court must implement
an approach closer to that of Hawaii than that
of Strickland. This will require simultaneously
lowering the burden of proof required for de-
fendants to demonstrate ineffective assistance
of counsel, and requiring the government to
prove a lack of prejudice once they have done
so. The Supreme Court must also outline clear
211 HOUPPERT,supra note 29, at 40.
minimum standards for attorneys defending
capital cases.
An excellent model starting point for
this is Hawaiian state precedent. Hawaii makes
it easier for defendants to prevail in ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel cases than Strick-
land. Under the standard established in State
(Y. Antone, Hawaii requires defendants to prove
that their attorney committed errors "reflect-
ing counsel's lack of skill, judgment or dili-
gence. 212 Subsequent precedent has demon-
strated that a crucial aspect of this is that "a
decision not to investigate cannot be consid-
ered a tactical decision."213 This will contribute
to solving the issue of extreme and unwarrant-
ed deference to attorneys that Strickland im-
plemented. This standard would help reverse
many cases where courts invented post-hoc
rationalizations of defense counsel's malfea-
sance as a deliberate tactic.
In one extreme instance, a lawyer ex-
plained that he slept during trial because he
was elderly and enjoyed taking an afternoon
nap.214 The appellate court held that this did
not constitute ineffective assistance of coun-
sel because it could conceivably have been a
ploy.215 That the lawyer's explanation made no
mention of a ploy was apparently immaterial.
Under this standard, this would constitute be-
havior "reflecting counsel's lack of skill, judge-
ment, or diligence," and there would be no op-
212 Hawaii v. Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 104 (1980). This
standard also requires that "these errors or omissions
resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial impair-
ment of a potentially meritorious defense." Id. The court
should not adopt this half of the standard, because
some malfeasance (like sleeping or being intoxicated at
work) may not directly cause such specified problems.
213 Hawaii v. Aplaca, 837 P.2d 1298, 1301 (1992).
214 Williams, supra note 2, at 141.
211 Williams, supra note 2, at 141.
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tion for the court to fabricate a rationalization
for it.
216
A standard that the Supreme Court
should implement would also require the gov-
ernment to prove lack ofprejudice once the de-
fendant has established errors "reflecting coun-
sel's lack of skill, judgement or diligence."217
Previous scholars have suggested this reversal
of the burden of proof as a way of alleviating the
extreme difficulty of showing prejudice by de-
fendants. 218 Fusing this approach with Hawaii's
system would go a long way towards solving
this problem. Recall that the massive burden
of proving prejudice is a driving factor behind
Strickland's host of problems. 219 The Supreme
Court has acknowledged that proving this is
nearly impossible. Yet later jurisprudence de-
manded that defendants do just that.22° This
makes it nearly impossible for them to remedy
the problems of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. Such an unjust state of affairs violates the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as well as
retributivism's demand that offenders receive
the just deserts of their actions.
Removing the requirement that defen-
dants prove prejudice would drastically reduce
this problem. Instead, it will be incumbent
upon the state to prove that the lawyer's defi-
cient performance did not prejudice the defen-
dant. This will take the burden off of the defen-
dant, who is poorly equipped to shoulder such
a high burden. The government is better posi-
tioned to make such a case. Such an arrange-
ment will better balance the burden between
the two parties, and thus make it easier for just
claims to prevail. It will also allow the state to
demonstrate a lack of prejudice, which address-
es the concerns of those who fear that this will
let too many guilty people go free. Since the
government will have an opportunity to prove
a lack of prejudice, small procedural errors that
did not affect the case will not free guilty de-
fendants. This is a far better way to balance the
competing interests between the state and the
rights of accused persons.
CONCLUSION
Ineffective assistance of counsel is a
blight upon this country. It results in innocent
and less-deserving offenders receiving death,
while those who have better lawyers receive
comparatively lighter punishments. This is un-
constitutional under the Sixth Amendment and
a moral travesty to under a retributivist penal
philosophy. The sheer depth and breadth of the
problem does mean that it violates both con-
servative and progressive values, which means
that each side can unite behind the common
cause of justice. This will involve expanding
funding for indigent defense, and heavily mod-
ifying the problematic Strickland case.
216 Antone, 615 P.2d at 101, 104.
21 Antone, 615 P.2d at 101, 104.
218 Geimer supra note 56, at 165.
21 Geimer supra note 56, at 165.
220 Geimer, supra note 56, at 165.
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